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Profile of Gertrud Lovasy (1900/1902-1974)

By Troy Vettese | 2024




Here are some of Lovasy’s most important publications and reports from the 1940s to the 1960s:

 

 "International Trade under Imperfect Competition." Quarterly Journal of Economics 55, no. 4

(1941): 567–583.

 

 International Cartels: A League of Nations Memorandum. No. 1948. UN, 1947.

 

 ‘Commodity Stabilization Agreements: A Note’. Memorandum, IMF, 10 July 1953.

 

"Survey and Appraisal of Proposed Schemes of Compensatory Financing." Staff Papers- International Monetary Fund (1965): 189–223.

 

"Evolution of the Fund’s Policy on Drawings." In Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation , volume 2. Edited by J. Keith Horsefield (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1969): 381–427.

 

 

Personal Life

We know relatively little about her personal life. Historians even disagree about Lovasy’s age. Some believe she was born in 1900 (Dziobek 1999, Feichtinger 2001), while others suggest 1902 (Nautz 2000, Becchio 2018); they do at least concur that she died in 1974 and there seems to be some consensus on her birthday—17 December. One source mentions that she died in Washington DC on 9 January (Dziobek 1999). She was born in Vienna and grew up in Baden, where she attended Realgymnasium (Nautz 2000). At some point she dropped the aristocratic ‘von’ in her name (it never appears in her publications). She was Jewish, though it is not clear if she came from an observant family or not. It appears she never married or had children. It is not clear how she died.

 

Career Outline

In April 1924 she enrolled at the law faculty at the University of Vienna, where she studied until the winter semester of 1926–1927 (Feichtinger 2001), and defended her dissertation on 18 December 1928 (Nautz 2000). Officially, she was a student of Hans Mayer—who beat out Ludwig von Mises for Friedrich von Wieser’s chair in 1923 —but she, like many others, attended Mises’ Privatseminar (Becchio 2018). Her dissertation was titled ‘The Legal Position of Cartel with a Special Focus on the Austrian Iron Industry’ (Die rechtliche Stellung der Kartelle unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der österreichischen Eisenindustrie). It is not exactly clear what Lovasy did after graduation. She might have immediately begun work at the Austrian Institute for Trade Cycle Research (Wiener Institut für Konjunkturforschung), which was founded by Friedrich Hayek and Mises in 1927 (Dziobek 1999). Two other sources (Feichtinger 2001, Korotin 2016), however, claim she only started working there in the mid-1930s. Feichtinger (2001) claims that she worked for eleven years in the office of the Austrian steel cartel before joining the Konjunktur institute. In general, the secondary sources are full of contradictions.


In 1938, she prepared to leave Austria to avoid persecution by the Nazis. She asked her colleague at the institute, economist Gerhard Tintner, to help her escape. He contacted Jakob Marschak at the University of Oxford and gave the following recommendation: ‘She is a very competent theoretical economist and also very good in applied economics. She was working at the Austrian Institute for Trade Cycle Research under Dr. Morgenstern, and I know that he was very pleased with her work and would be willing to give her good recommendations’ (cited in Feichtinger 2001). As Marschak himself could not help Lovasy, he turned to the London Academic Aid Committee for assistance—but Lovasy had already contacted them without success (Feichtinger 2001). This group told Lovasy that legally they were not able to help her as they could only assist those who taught at universities, but Feichtinger notes that often the committee made exceptions for refugees backed by influential patrons. Notably, Hayek did not try to help Lovasy by including her either on his list of ‘Displaced Austrian Scholars’ or mentioning her in his letter to the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (Feichtinger 2001). Lovasy’s departure from Austria was also delayed by her elderly mother, but eventually Alfred Stonier (an economist at UCL and former colleague at Mises’ seminar) made arrangements for her care which allowed both of them to head to the UK (Feichtinger 2001). Lovasy, however, did not stay long in the UK as an affidavit from Gottfried Haberler allowed her to get an American visa in 1939 (Feichtinger 2001).


Upon arriving in the US, Lovasy went to Princeton to continue working under Morgenstern, who had been her boss at the Konjunktur institute. Between 1939 and 1942 she worked with him on his economic history of Austria in the interwar period (Feichtinger 2001). At this point, the historical record becomes murky again. It is not clear exactly when she changed jobs to join the League of Nations and, later on, the UN. In her review of Civitas Humana (Lovasy 1944) and essay on price instability (Lovasy 1945), she listed her residence as Princeton and did not mention her occupation. Complicating matters, Princeton was where the League’s economic and financial staff were based during the war (Pauly 1999). Dziobek (1999) claims that Lovasy began to work for the ‘Economic and Financial Department’ of the League of Nations in 1946, but that seems a bit late given that she had finished her report on cartels a year before. Pauly (1999) says that Lovasy began her study on cartels during the war as a ‘junior League staffer’, and circulated a draft by 1945 though it was only published by the United Nations in 1947 after the League was dissolved. In 1947, Lovasy began working as an economist for the International Monetary Fund, a position she would hold until her retirement in 1965, after which she consulted occasionally for the Organization of American States (Dziobek 1999).

Within the IMF, she ascended the ranks from being an economist within the Special Studies Division, to assistant chief of the Special Studies Division, and then to advisor in the Research and Statistics Department, though Dziobek does not give dates for these promotions. Just by going through her publications, one can see that as late as 1956 she was still an economist in the Special Studies Division (Lovasy 1956a). By 1962 her title was ‘Assistant Chief of the Special Studies Division’ (Lovasy 1962a) and in 1964 it was ‘Advisor in the Research and Statistics Department’ (Lovasy and Boissonneault 1964). In 1963, she led the development of the IMF’s ‘compensatory financing facility’ (Dziobek 1999), which was intended to stabilize the prices of primary commodities. She wrote about this topic in detail (Lovasy 1965). In the 1960s, Lovasy was active in the negotiations for agreement on the coffee trade, which required her to travel often, especially to Latin America and London (Dziobek 1999). She retired in 1965.

 

Lovasy’s Connections to the Neoliberal Thought Collective

Becchio (2018) represents the consensus view in the historiography that Lovasy was a loyal neoliberal, though this assumption appears untenable upon closer examination. Becchio (2018) declares that that ‘economists of the second generation [of the Austrian school] were definitely against any form of government intervention in regulating the economy’ and that ‘Mises-trained Gertrude Lovasy is the most emblematic example’ of second-generation Austrian school women and that ‘she was intolerant toward the intergovernmental cartels that were accepted by American policy of that time [after World War II]’. Notably, Becchio herself seems to be a neoliberal, given that she has followed the typical Hayekian cursus honorum, with stints at Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke and the Austrian seminar at NYU in the 1990s, as well as having penned a book on Menger. By contrast, this report argues that Lovasy might have been a proto-neoliberal early in her career, but shifted to the centre-left by the mid-1940s. In the 1930s, there is plenty of evidence that Lovasy participated in neoliberal networks. Her first published article, ‘Schutzzölle bei unvollkommener Konkurrenz’ (Lovasy 1934), engaged closely and sympathetically with Haberler’s work. Lovasy then translated an essay by Frank Knight (1935), ‘Bemerkungen über Nutzen und Kosten’ (‘Notes on Cost and Utility’—the title was accidentally inverted in the later English version), which was largely unavailable in English until 1951 (Emmett 2013). Her next work, ‘Preisverbundenheit bei „ökonomischer Äquivalenz“’ (Lovasy 1936), is a technical, in-depth continuation of her studies into imperfect competition and international trade, which she extended further in ‘International Trade under Imperfect Competition’ (1941). Yet, even in this period when she belonged to neoliberal networks, she seems to repeatedly argue against any simple notion that free trade would necessarily lead to more trade. This unorthodox approach that would guide her research for the rest of her career even as her loyalties to the Austrian school waned.


A shift in her intellectual affinities could be detected near the end of the war when she reviewed Wilhelm Röpke’s Civitas Humana (Lovasy 1944). She attacked Röpke for his ‘extreme views on collectivism,’ was unconvinced by how the ordos planned to ‘eliminate monopolistic influences’, and was bewildered that his framework of ‘economic humanism’ rejects any redistribution of income. One wonders if the lack of support she received from Hayek in 1938 had much to do with the weakening bonds tying her to the neoliberal thought collective.

If one could venture a tentative hypothesis, it seems that Lovasy retained some neoliberal intuitions even as she abjured that movement’s broader, conservative goals. For example, in the post-war period she espoused price stability as a major economic goal. Neoliberals have emphasized the importance of price stability because it facilitates the market’s function as an information processor—if prices are constantly changing, it is harder for consumers to glean or provide information. In ‘Does the Consumer Benefit from Price Instability? Further Comment’ (Lovasy 1945), she argued for stabilizing the prices of primary products at the ‘weighted average’, then more units will be sold overall than in a situation where prices fluctuated. Similarly, in ‘Inflation and Exports in Primary Producing Countries’ (Lovasy 1962a), she observed that countries with low inflation had greater growth in exports than countries with high inflation. Yet, unlike her erstwhile neoliberal comrades, Lovasy believes that price stability can be achieved through intergovernmental mechanisms, rather than relying on unaccountable central banks or crushing unions.

 

Remarks on Lovasy’s Studies for the League and IMF

Cartels, and cartel-like structures (e.g., price stabilization agreements) are the offspring of war and contemporaries in the mid-twentieth century were cognizant of this relationship (Knorr 1945; Cerretano 2012; Bertilorenzi 2015; Lovasy 1947). Traditional trade relations were often ruptured by the onset of hostilities, with governments responding by setting up new lines of production for military equipment. These wartime economic arrangements, however, tended to prove quite fragile once peace returned. This schema applies to the 1920s following World War I (Bertilorenzi 2015 p. 33; Lovasy 1947 p. 6), and contemporaries in the 1940s and 1950s feared that similar conditions would follow World War II (Lovasy, 1947 p. 49) and the end of the Korean War (Lovasy 1956a). This economic pattern, however, differed in these three post-war periods. The cartels in the 1920s and 1930s were defined by three traits: they were concentrated in sectors for secondary goods (e.g., chemicals, steel), most of the firms were European, and they were private agreements (Bertilorenzi 2015 p. 33). The author of this report is not an expert on cartels, but it seems likely that Lovasy was an important figure in transforming both the understanding and structure of cartels along these three axes in the post-war era. After World War II, efforts to stabilize prices would mainly concern primary goods, be organized at the international level, and with heavy government involvement (Bertilorenzi 2015 makes this argument to some extent).

As mentioned before, Lovasy was sceptical already in the 1930s that free trade necessarily translated into more trade. This scepticism, however, seemed to deepen in the post-war period. She believed more trade was a good thing, but doubted that markets could always be relied upon to achieve this objective: ‘From mistrusting the functioning of that [price] mechanism there is, however, only one step to recognizing the need for something to take its place: cartels, national and international, may then be considered as a possible answer’ (1947 p. 42). This shift in economic orthodoxyturned ‘the subject of international cartels’ into what she called one of the ‘most controversial economic questions now under discussion’ (Lovasy 1947 p. 32). The point of international price stabilization agreements—through governments rather than private firms—was to stabilize foreign trade and to help retrench sectors that had over-expanded during the war years (Lovasy 1947 p. 52).


Over her career, Lovay studied several different kinds of market failure. In her study on the cotton trade, she noticed that Canadians continued to buy cloth from the United States even though British cloth was temporarily about five per cent cheaper. Canadians continued to prefer American cloth because of the shortness of supply routes and advertising, and therefore, Lovasy concluded, ‘nothing short of considerable price concessions by U. K. (sic) exporters could swing the Canadian market back to its prewar sources of supply’ (1953a). Her belief that the market was fragmented and illiquid recalls her earlier work on imperfect competition. In other instances, the price system was quite an ineffectual lever to induce changes in consumer behaviour. For example, primary commodities may be crucial to a poor country desperate to garner hard currency, but demand for their products is determined mainly by demand for associated manufactured goods that use these commodities. Producers in poor countries then are relatively powerless to react to falling demand. Even if they reduce their prices considerably, ‘price changes have little effect on the demand’ for primary goods (Lovasy 1953b p. 1) because they only make up a small fraction of the price of manufactured goods. As Lovasy has made clear since her 1947 paper on cartels, government controls could replace private cartels to manage trade when ‘equilibrium is not likely to emerge through forces of competition’ (1947 p. 32). The need for such action was ‘now widely accepted with respect to certain raw materials markets (Lovasy 1947 p. 32). Price stabilization through buffer stock programs could avoid unnecessary balance of payment crises (Lovasy 1953b p. 15–16).


Lovasy looked at how her general framework could be applied to the specific commodities of tin, coffee, sugar, and cotton. For example, coffee was doomed to cycles of boom and bust because the botanical peculiarities of the plant made it impossible for individual producers to respond adequately to price signals. It took four to five years for a newly planted tree to start producing beans, thus producers could not quickly respond to high prices. Yet, as trees lived thirty to forty years, a long period of depressed prices would follow a boom as too many trees were planted to meet demand (Lovasy 1955 p. 2). During a period of glut in the mid-1950s, Lovasy (1955 p. 2) estimated that ‘taking account of the very feeble response of demand to price changes, it appears that prices would have to be lowered to some 30–40 per cent below the 1953 level in order to “clear the market”’. A program based on buffer stocks, Lovasy argued, could rationalize the coffee market. As she summarized in another report on the coffee sector several years later,

 

The problem facing coffee exporting countries is thus obviously one of heavy and, in the absence of remedial action, protracted surpluses and a wasteful accumulation of stocks. The final solution can consist only in restoring, and in the longer run maintaining, a reasonable balance between demand and supply (Lovasy 1962b).

 

Notably, abolishing tariffs on coffee would not solve the problem. Even if there was free trade, consumption would only increase by a tenth or so, which would put only a small dent in the oversupply problem (Lovasy 1962b p. 235–236). The market cannot be relied on to ensure the smooth function of trade: ‘concerted action is required to determine, on broad lines, the desirable level of production in individual countries’ (Lovasy 1962b p. 236).


While looking through her reports, one also begins to see how Lovasy perceived the role of the United States in international trade. The country had an outsized influence on the tin trade, where the US government bought huge amounts of the metal for strategic stockpiles during the Korean War. After that war ended, the US government negotiated harsh trade deals with various poor exporting countries (Lovasy 1952b). Things were a little better when the US exports primary commodities instead. She argued forcefully for a ‘comprehensive network of stabilization agreements’ that would benefit all trading countries, which the IMF should encourage through stand-by credit (Lovasy 1953b). Yet, ‘the trade-generating effect could be negligible’ when ‘a large proportion of the trade covered originates from the United States’ (Lovasy 1953b p. 19).

Lovasy did not say this explicitly, but it seems that the US represented a less fair and effective version of the international trade policy she wanted. As with tin during the Korean War, the US was able to set the international price for a primary commodity, but not always to the advantage of other countries. Similarly, in the 1950s the US more or less set the international price for cotton when ‘U. S.  (sic) support operations [for domestic cotton farmers] had become the main factor in determining cotton prices on world markets’ (Lovasy 1956b p. 8). Yet, the US did not stabilize prices for long. A few years later, the US sought to recapture its market share in the global cotton trade and simultaneously find an outlet for excess domestic production, so it dumped an extra million bales a year—further depressing world prices (Lovasy 1956b p. 10). The US set prices for the world market because it was by far the largest consumer of primary commodities, around 20–25% of the total (Lovasy 1956a p. 50–52). Other governments could only play a minor role in a similar way, such as when the Chilean government tried to support copper prices by buying up excess supplies after the Korean War, but eventually the US had to step in and buy the Chilean inventory (Lovasy 1956a 68–69).


Her report titled ‘Survey and Appraisal of Proposed Schemes of Compensatory Financing’ (1965) is a useful overview of the various ones governments could stabilize commodity prices at the international level. She summarized the previous decade’s efforts:

 

Compensatory transfers to mitigate the adverse effects of changes in the terms of trade were first   proposed in 1953, but did not gain support; some ten years later, similar proposals were submitted to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In the late 1950's and at the beginning of the 1960's, schemes aimed at compensating for shortfalls in export receipts were devised by a UN Committee of Experts, and, later, by a working party established within the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS). Also, expansion of assistance, geared to that particular purpose, by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was favored; and in 1963, the IMF responded [p. 190]  with the creation of its compensatory financing facility. Simultaneously with the emergence of proposals for compensatory action in the event of export shortfalls, thoughts of replacing price support in international commodity agreements by                    compensatory transfers began to take shape. The UNCTAD produced further suggestions, and in   the discussions much emphasis was laid on compensatory financing as a convenient device for solving short-term and long-term problems (Lovasy 1965 p. 189–190).

 

Again, buffer stocks were Lovasy’s preferred tool, especially if the compensatory mechanisms only were activated for price floors rather than ceilings to prevent transfer of wealth from poor to rich countries (Lovasy 1965 p. 196). In the 1950s, Raúl Prebisch also supported one-way compensatory mechanisms (Lovasy 1965 p. 199). In a report from 1968 she detailed Prebisch’s effort to negotiate an international sugar deal (Lovasy 1968). In a strange twist of irony, one of the impediments of the deal was the Eastern Bloc’s dumping of Cuban sugar onto the global market (Lovasy 1968 p. 3). That is, cutthroat competitive behaviour of socialist states stood in the way of an international deal to consciously control commodity markets.


At the end of her career, Lovasy wrote about her work in the IMF’s official history, Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, in the section titled ‘Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctuations’ (Lovasy and Horsefield 1969). She called this piece of writing her ‘little opus’ (Lovasy 1969). Lovay saw the IMF’s 1963 compensatory facility as the crowning achievement of her career, despite some reservations, as it was ‘less ambitious than some of the schemes proposed, but readily available to member countries experiencing export shortfalls which endanger their balance of payments’ (Lovasy and Horsefield 1969 p. 417). The establishment of the facility took a decade, after it had first been financed by UN experts in 1953 (Lovasy cites this publication: Commodity Trade and Economic Development; Submitted by a Committee appointed by the Secretary General, United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs). She cited those experts, who thought that while the IMF could finance countercyclical lending that fit with the IMF’s métier, its implementation ‘would involve a radical change in scale and action’ (cited in Lovasy and Horsefield 1969 p. 417) that would require significant resources. Notably, Lovasy observes that at the time there were fears of a severe global depression, for which the IMF might not be ready (Lovasy and Horsefield 1969 p. 418). While a depression did not happen, commodity prices were low in the second half of the 1950s, to the detriment of many poor exporting countries. Lovasy sees the 1959 UN Commission on International Commodity Trade (CICT) to have been especially important at this juncture:

 

It was decided, as a first step, to explore the role of the Fund in this connection, and the Fund was invited to inform the Commission about its policies and procedures as they bore on the subject. In response to this request the staff prepared a report, “Fund Policies and Procedures in Relation to Compensatory Financing of Commodity Fluctuations.” Though this report has been superseded by later documents announcing the Fund's decision to establish a special compensatory facility, it contributed much by way of clarifying issues and explaining the Fund's attitude; it also laid the foundation for methods of measuring export shortfalls (Lovasy and Horsefield 1969 p. 419).

 

There were debates about how the financing would work and the resources it required. The IMF set up the facility in February 1963 and presented it to the CICT that May (Lovasy and Horsefield 1969 p. 421), and eventually the IMF worked out how to calculate what a shortfall was and how much financing could be available (i.e., the five-year moving average of exports, centred on the shortfall year). It took some time before countries could qualify for support, but by 1969 it appeared to Lovasy that the facility had proven a success.

 


 

Bibliography

 

Sources by Lovasy

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. "Schutzzölle bei unvollkommener Konkurrenz." Zeitschrift für    Nationalökonomie/Journal of Economics (1934): 336–355.

 

Knight, Frank H. and Gertrud Lovasy. "Bemerkungen über Nutzen und Kosten." Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (1935): 28–52.

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. "Preisverbundenheit bei „ökonomischer Äquivalenz“." Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (1936): 94–97.

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. "International Trade under Imperfect Competition." Quarterly Journal of Economics 55, no. 4 (1941): 567–583.

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. "Civitas Humana: Grundlagen der Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsreform." American Economic Review 34, no. 4 (1944): 907–909.

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. "Does the Consumer Benefit from Price Instability? Further Comment." Quarterly Journal of Economics 59, no. 2 (1945): 296–301.

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. International Cartels: A League of Nations Memorandum. No. 1948. UN, 1947.

 

(A) Lovasy, Gertrud. ‘Recent Developments and Prospects on the International Coffee Market.’ Memorandum, IMF, 14 March 1952, Ref: 97503 [available at the IMF online archive].

 

(B) Lovasy, Getrud. ‘Development and Prospects on the International Tin Market.’

Memorandum, IMF, 8 April 1952, Ref: 97481 [available at the IMF online archive].

 

(A) Lovasy, Gertrud. "Rise in US Share of World Textile Trade." Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund 3, no. 1 (1953): 47–68.

 

(B) Lovasy, Gertrud. ‘Commodity Stabilization Agreements: A Note’. Memorandum, IMF, 10 July 1953, Ref: 97480 [available at the IMF online archive].

 

Lovasy, Gertrud and H. K. Zassenhaus. "Short-Run Fluctuations in US Imports of Raw Materials, 1928–39 and 1947–52." Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund 3, no. 2 (1953): 270–289.

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. ‘Prospective Price Development for Coffee and Effect on Payments Position, etc.’ Memorandum, IMF, 24 October 1955, Ref: 97489 [available at the IMF online archive].

 

(A) Lovasy, Gertrud. "Prices of Raw Materials in the 1953–54 US Recession." Staff Papers – International Monetary Fund 5, no. 1 (1956): 47–73.

 

(B) Lovasy, Gertrud. ‘Note on Development and Prospects on the International Cotton Market.’ Memorandum, IMF, 6 July 1956, Ref: 97484 [available at the IMF online archive].

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. ‘A Note on Development on the International Tin Market.’ Memorandum, IMF, 28 October 1957, Ref: 97486[available at the IMF online archive].

 

(A) Lovasy, Gertrud. "Inflation and Exports in Primary Producing Countries." Staff Papers 9 (1962): 37–69.

 

(B) Lovasy, Gertrud. "The International Coffee Market: A Note." Staff Papers 9 (1962): 226–242.

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. ‘Recent Developments on the International Coffee Market.’ Memorandum, IMF, 20 February 1964, Ref:97502 [available at the IMF online archive].

 

Lovasy, Gertrud, and Lorette Boissonneault. "The International Coffee Market." Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund (1964): 367–388.

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. "Survey and Appraisal of Proposed Schemes of Compensatory Financing." Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund (1965): 189–223.

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. ‘U.N. Sugar Conference 1968: Main Features of the Agreement Adopted’, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 9 December 1968.

 

Lovasy, Gertrud. ‘Twenty-Year History: Miss Lovasy’s Chapter.’ Galley-proof, IMF,

1969, Ref: 102104 [available at the IMF online archive].

 

 

Lovasy, Gertrude and J. Keith Horsefield. "Evolution of the Fund’s Policy on Drawings." In Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation , volume 2. Edited by J. Keith Horsefield (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1969): 381–427.

 

Other Sources

 

Becchio, Giandomenica (ed.), A History of Feminist and Gender Economics (London and New York: Routledge, 2019).

 

– – –. ‘Austrian School Women Economists.’ In The Routledge Handbook of the History of Women’s Economic Thought (London: Routledge, 2018), 309–324.

 

Bertilorenzi, Marco. ‘Legitimising cartels: The joint roles of the League of Nations and of the International Chamber of Commerce’ in Regulating Competition, pp. 30–47. Routledge, 2015.

 

Cerretano, Valerio. ‘European cartels, European multinationals and economic de-globalisation: Insights from the rayon industry, c. 1900–1939.’ Business History, 54:4 (2012): 594–622.

 

Emmett, Ross. ‘Introduction’ in The Economic Organization by Frank Knight. Transaction Publishers 2013 [1951].

 

Feichtinger, Johannes. Wissenschaft zwischen den Kulturen: österreichische Hochschullehrer in der Emigration 1933–1945. (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2001).

 

Fellman, Susanna, and Martin Shanahan (eds.). Regulating Competition: Cartel Registers in the Twentieth-Century World (London: Routledge, 2015).

 

Flandreau, Marc, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, and Harold James (eds.). International Financial History in the Twentieth Century: System and Anarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

 

Knorr, Klaus E. ‘The problem of international cartels and intergovernmental commodity agreements.’ Yale Law Journal55 (1945): 1097–1126.

 

Korotin, Ilse. biografiA. Lexikon österreichischer Frauen, Band 1: Band 01, AH (Böhlau, 2016).

 

Nautz, Jürgen. ‘Lovasy, Gertrud’ in Harald Hagemann, Claus-Dieter Krohn (Hrsg.): Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Emigration nach 1933 (München: Saur, 1999).

 

Nautz, Jürgen. ‘Gertrud von Lovasy’ in R. Dimand, Dimand, M., and Forget, E. (eds.) A Biographical Dictionary of Women Economists (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), 260–261.

 

Nautz, Jürgen. ‘Gertrud Lovasy’ in Brigitta Keintzel, Ilse Korotin (eds.): Wissenschafterinnen in und aus Österreich : Leben – Werk – Wirken. Wien: Böhlau, 2002

 

Pauly, Louis W. ‘Good governance and Bad Policy: The Perils of International Organizational Overextension,’ Review of International Political Economy 6, no. 4 (1999): 401–424.

 


Reference anything from this site as:

Vettese, Troy (2024) 'International Economic Thinkers-Profile: Gertrud Lovasy', ECOINT IET Profile #8, available at: https://www.ecoint.org/post/profile-of-gertrud-lovasy-1900-1902-1974


 

 

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